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Abstract. In Aristotle’s thought, economic activity refers to a kind 
of praxis consisting in allocating the human and material means 
that constitute the oikos –the domestic community- to fulfil its 
natural ends: ensure both life and the means of life. By means of 
natural chrematistics -acquisitive art- families acquire the 
necessary means for this, which come from production and 
exchange. Families group together in the political community 
(polis) whose end is living well, according to virtues, among which 
justice is highlighted as the ‘complete virtue’. For its part, the 
Christian êthos regards every human act, internal and external, of 
this complete system (polis, oikos and chrematistics) as tending 
towards its ultimate purpose (beatitudo). In St. Thomas’s view, 
eternal law harmonizes necessity of irrational beings, loving God’s 
action (divine law), natural law, and the contingency of ‘human 
things’ where the economy is included. Trading activity is lawful 
if it is at the service of the oikos or polis and according to how is 
exercised, by following commutative justice. The family, political 
and religious character of human nature establishes what the 
natural-necessary consists of, embracing, apart from bodily goods, 
others derived from considering social status and the life chosen 
(civil, religious, active or contemplative). Economic activity based 
on this anthropological root has a specific place as a part of an 
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ordered natural-legal totality that provides the economy with 
meaning and sufficient moral guidance. 
 





Even though economics, together with politics, is a practical science and 
considered part of moral philosophy, following the marginalist revolution of the 
late nineteenth century, economics has ended up adopting as its pattern of 
scientificity that of the natural sciences, specifically, that of mathematical 
physics (Mirowski, 1989). In perspective, the consequences of this 
methodological approach are ambivalent. On the one hand, there has been an 
enormous development of quantitative techniques of analysis, useful both for the 
modelling of theoretical relations of some complexity and for the econometric 
testing of certain hypotheses. On the other hand, the limitations to the 
understanding of economic activity as a truly human activity with all that this 
entails, as well as the prediction errors repeatedly committed by mainstream 
economics [1] point to the need for a rethinking of the fundamentals of 
economic science. 
 
In this spirit and in spite of the centuries that have passed, to recall the 
conceptions of Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas about the place economic 
activity occupies in the ‘social whole’, may serve to set a valid starting point to 
redirect the scientific practice of economics, obviously not in its techniques of 
observation and modelling, but in its finality and ultimate meaning. According 
to a widely-held opinion, economics had been constituted as a science 
independent of philosophy since Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations. This work 
coincides, not by chance, with the beginnings of the Industrial Revolution in 
England. ‘The economy’, understood as the set of productive and mercantile 
activities, apparently emerged as a space of action with its own dynamics, 
independent of other contexts of sociability such as religion, moral, family or 
politics. It is significant that Smith himself studies morality, regarded the result 
of a feeling of sympathy that leads to concern for others (The Theory of Moral 
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Sentiments, 1759, Ch. 1), as a world apart from the working of ‘amoral’ markets 
exclusively based on self-interest. However, as is well-known, this fact does not 
lead to conflict between men, but to harmony thanks to the famous ‘invisible 
hand’ (The Wealth of Nations, 1779, Ch. 2). 
 
The supposition that the economy is set apart from the other spheres of human 
sociability [2] is pointed to as one of the causes of the insufficiencies that 
economic science has both to explain and to propose solutions to important 
problems faced by today’s societies (lack of solidarity, corruption, 
underdevelopment, inequality). In contrast, Aristotelian economic thought and 
its scholastic extension assign to the economy a specific place coherently 
integrated in the ‘social whole’. Thus, economic activity, conceived on the basis 
of a Christian anthropological foundation such as that underlying Thomistic 
scholasticism and the current Social Doctrine of the Church [3], occupies a 
precise place as part of a natural legal ordered totality, which furnishes sense 
and moral guidance to this activity. 
 
The objective of this paper is to analyze how the insertion of the economy into a 
natural social order occurs according to the Aristotelian-Thomistic perspective. 
For this, we must refer to the original meaning of ‘the economy’ because our 
modern conception of the economy does not coincide with that of Aristotle and 
the Greek thought. Oikonomia refers originally to the law (nomos) of the house 
(oikos) (Leshem, 2016, proposes ‘household management’). In classical Greece, 
the oikos included both goods and persons -free and slave- under the authority of 
the head of the household, what we would call the family and family wealth, a 
unity of persons and goods. In modern times, the meaning of ‘the economy’ as 
relative to the family governance of persons and goods has been lost, while what 
originally constituted ‘the chrematistics’ (the acquisition of livelihoods) has been 
identified in practice with ‘the economy’ such as it is commonly understood 
today. This semantic change makes it difficult to appreciate the organic 
relationship that Aristotle established between ethics and economics (Encinar et 
al., 2006) since the natural, morally permissible, chrematistics is subordinated to 
the oikos, and, in turn, the oikos is subordinated to the polis [4] in which the 
human ideal of social coexistence is realized. Strictly, ‘the ethical’ in economics 
is the prudent administration of the oikos within a fair polis. 
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Singer (1958) analyses the semantic change in the term oikonomia and the 
extension of its meaning so as to denote the proper disposition of the parts of a 
whole in order to achieve its end, being able to refer, for example, to the cosmos, 
to a work of art or to a body. Singer refers to Hesiod, who in Works and Days 
(ca. 700 BC) tells how a farmer must solve the problem of human need through 
work, moderation, honesty and knowledge of how and when it is necessary to 
carry out the various tasks, adjusting the desires to the resources, and especially 
the arrangements and acts with a view to enjoying a good life. From it, Aristotle 
takes the verse that summarizes the object of the economy: ‘First house and wife 
and an ox for the plough’ (Pol. I, 2, 1252b). Xenophon’s Oeconomicus (ca. 380 
BC), prior to Aristotle’s Politics, shares a similar conception of what constitutes 
the management of the oikos, which includes domestic worship. He describes the 
various occupations within the oikos and their overlap with the relationships 
between their members, between husband and wife, parents and children, and 
master and slaves. That is how it is defined the object of study of the economy as 
Aristotle shows later in his Politics  [5]. It should be noted that Aristotle does 
not simply extend ‘the economy’ from the oikos to the polis  [6], since he does not 
identify the forms of domestic and political governance. The polis, when 
claiming a good superior to the oikos, comprises the oikos, is of a different 
species, and is different in its mode of governance (Pol. I, 7, 1255b 16). Aristotle 
does also conceive a natural chrematistics at the service of the polis. 
 
According to this original conception, ‘the economy’ is referred to the 
administration of persons and goods within the family community. ‘The 
economy’ places the family [7] as a core agent on which the political community 
finds itself as superior instance. For their part, production and exchange -
chrematistics as art of acquiring- are placed as subordinate settings. As we see in 
the second section of this work, the way in which these three spaces of action -
polis, oikos and chrematistics- are integrated following Aristotle is both a 
natural result of virtuous personal action and an ideal of good social order. Its 
natural character makes this order both a positive and a normative reality. We 
analyze what constitutes the natural social order of polis and oikos in Aristotle 
according to what is discussed in his Politics and Nicomachean Ethics focusing 
on the relationship between economy and chrematistics. 
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For Aristotle, the purpose of chrematistics is coherent with that of the oikos, 
and that of the oikos with that of the polis. St. Thomas expands the chain 
claiming that every act, internal and external, must be coherent with religion. 
An analytical perspective based on hierarchical ordering of spaces of action is 
not clearly present in the literature in spite that this order is fundamental for 
practical philosophy. When abstracting from this, it is difficult to understand, 
for example, Aristotle’s very restrictive position on trade and profit [8] or the 
more permissive one of St. Thomas, as well as the relevance of the virtues for 
management, the concept of ‘the necessary’ to live, the insistence on the fair price 
or the treatment of usury. The usual analysis of Greek and scholastic economic 
thought is confined to its chrematistic aspects and dismisses the ‘extra-economic’ 
context (‘extra-chrematistics’ would be more correct) that provides a more 
complete meaning to this thought.  
 
The Christian êthos regards any human act, internal and external, as tending to 
its ultimate end (the beatitudo), adding a ‘religious space of action’ of superior 
rank, what affects to the whole system of chrematistics, oikos and polis. This 
issue is analyzed in the third section of this work. Of the three parts of St. 
Thomas’s Summa Theologiae, the second (Secunda) is divided into two parts. Its 
first part focuses on human action in general (Prima Secundae, I-II) which 
includes the treatise on law, and the second one focuses on human action in 
particular (Secunda Secundae, II-II). This includes the treatise on justice, 
which is considered as Aquinas’s genuine commentary on Aristotle’s ethics. St. 
Thomas’s thought about chrematistics [9] constitutes a small part of his moral 
and theological work. It is organically integrated within the Summa, distributed 
among the virtues of justice, prudence, and charity; but as a part of the practical 
reason, economic activity is and must be subject to the law, perspective not 
considered when analyzing Thomistic economic thought. For St. Thomas, the 
eternal law is the order of Creation -Christian translation of the Greek cosmos- 
which man freely accepts according to the fulfilment of the divine plan of 
Salvation. The law manages to harmonize the need of irrational beings (‘laws of 
nature’), God’s loving action (divine law), moral necessity (natural law) and the 
contingency of ‘human affairs’ that include, but are not limited, to the human 
law. The concept of law according to the Summa has important implications for 
economic activity in a double perspective of institutions (human law stricto 
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sensu) and behaviours (virtues). From Plato to the eighteenth century, the 
themes traditionally described as ‘the economy’ (in its chrematistic or mercantile 
sense) are dealt with in relation to the virtue of justice. This is the usual 
approach to scholastic economic thought. However, we have also considered it 
relevant, given the purpose of this work, to include other considerations about 
the place of economic activity in the legal and social order, which St. Thomas 
addresses in relation to the virtues of charity and prudence, as well as his 
concept of the ‘natural necessary’, fundamental to understanding his economic 
thought. In section four, we conclude this work. Methodologically, we have 
opted throughout the text to differentiate the synthesis of the original texts by 
means of paraphrase or textual quotations, from our analysis. We hope to have 
achieved this clearly enough. 
 
 
The natural social order: polis, oikos and chrematistics 
 
We consider here the place that ‘the economy’, as the management of the 
household, occupies in Aristotelian thought [10]. The oikos is the basic unit of 
people and goods whose fundamental objective is to ensure life and provide for 
livelihoods, that is, to ensure its continuity according to its nature. In relation to 
the oikos, two spaces of action are determined: the chrematistic one, by which 
the oikos obtain the livelihoods, and the political space of action, that arises 
from the grouping of families in order to achieve not only living but also living 
well according to the virtues, among which justice is the complete virtue. 
 
Book I of Aristotle’s Politics is dedicated to the family community, origin and 
part of the political community, the polis. The oikos is based on three 
relationships or pairings given by nature (Pol. I, 2, 1252a 25-32): man with 
woman, father with offspring, and master with slave. The oikos is the 
‘association established by nature for the supply of men’s everyday wants’, to live. 
The polis is the perfect community emerging from several villages, groupings of 
families formerly ruled by kings. It surpasses the oikos in perfection since, 
although the polis has its origin in the urgency of the life, which the oikos 
serves, the polis exists ‘for the sake of a good life’ (Pol. I, 2, 1252b 30). Thus, the 
ideal of living well of the original communities is fulfilled, the polis constitutes 
Cendejas Bueno, José Luis (2017), 'Economics, chrematistics, oikos and polis 
in Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas ', The Journal of Philosophical Economics: 
Reflections on Economic and Social Issues, X: 2, 5-46 
 
The Journal of Philosophical Economics X: 2 (2017)                                               11  
its perfection, and in this sense, is self-sufficient, autarkic. The polis is natural, 
and man, by nature, is a political -or civic- animal (zoon politikon, Pol. I, 2, 
1253a). The polis is logically earlier than the oikos and each individual, since 
the whole comes before its parts. Justice is the order of the polis and also the 
virtue on which it is based. Justice consists in the appreciation of what is fair, 
which is communicated through language. 
 
The economy, understood as administration of the house, must be differentiated 
from chrematistics [11]. The characteristic of chrematistics is the acquisition of 
useful goods, whereas the economy itself is the use of these goods (Pol. I, 8, 
1256a 10-15). Parts of chrematistics include grazing, agriculture, piracy, fishing 
and hunting (Pol. I, 8, 1256b). These activities serve the management of the 
household because they provide essential goods for life. The goods thus acquired 
serve for their natural use (eating, dressing, living, etc.). Such goods constitute 
the wealth: sum of means or instruments at the service of the oikos and the polis. 
This art of acquisition is natural and limited by the fulfilment of the proper 
purposes of the oikos and the polis, that is, to live and live well. 
 
Chrematistics is also the acquisitive art that may lack a limit and be at the 
service of neither oikos nor the polis (Pol. I, 9, 1257a 1-8). It is based on using 
the essential goods for life for something that is not their natural use such as is 
their exchange. Within the oikos, change is unthinkable, as well as unnecessary. 
It becomes so when the community becomes more extensive. Then the exchange 
of useful goods through barter is natural because it allows self-sufficiency. 
When making exchanges in greater volume and because of the difficulty of 
transport to greater distances, the use of money is introduced by necessity. 
Thanks to money, society can pass from the indispensable and natural change to 
trading (Pol. I, 9, 1257b 9-14). With exchanges being monetized, the wealth that 
money symbolizes -the value of money is conventional [12], not natural, and 
changing with circumstances- allows an unnatural and endless accumulation. 
As a means to some end, one cannot imagine an unlimited accumulation that 
satisfies a limited purpose. This chrematistics is not part of the economy, 
because the aim of the management of the household, in addition to being 
limited by what is necessary [13], is not the accumulation of wealth. 
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The confusion between economy and disorderly chrematistics leads some people 
to assert that the purpose of the economy is the unlimited accumulation of 
wealth (Pol. I, 9, 1258a). In short, there is a necessary chrematistics, 
subordinated to the economy, which takes care of sustenance and has a limit; 
and another one, unnatural and unlimited. This second chrematistics leads 
many people to pervert the other arts (e.g., the military art, the medicine) by 
transforming them into means of making money. This chrematistics is justly 
censured and is not according to nature because it is at the expense of others. 
Usury, which is based on it, is, of all business, the most unnatural. Through 
usury, money is the son of money (Pol. I, 10, 1258b 1-6), usury not being the 
purpose for which the money was created. In addition to commerce and usury, 
wage labor and monopoly are also part of this chrematistics. Mining and logging 
are halfway between the natural and the trading chrematistics (Pol. I, 11, 1258b, 
21-34). 
 
Consequently, ‘the economy’ refers in its origin to the union, not confusion, of 
family and family wealth, because the fulfilment of its natural end requires 
such a union for the satisfaction of the daily necessities that ensure the own 
continuity of the family. Although the family is not self-sufficient in a full 
sense, since it needs the polis to fulfil the moral ideal of living well. The 
acquisition of the necessary goods for living has a natural limit that is 
transgressed when wealth is accumulated as an end in itself, which is opposed to 
its instrumental nature. While trade and money do not contravene the nature of 
‘the economy’, they make this process possible, something impossible in its 
absence. Hence the transition from a fundamentally agrarian economy of 
limited exchanges to another where trade gains preponderance [14] and currency 
becomes widely used, is seen as a threat to the natural order of oikos and polis. 
 
The acquisition of necessary goods for life is done ‘leaving the house’ and this is 
its distinctive feature, while their use takes place ‘inside the house’. As Aristotle 
points out, this ‘going out to acquire’, either seeks to obtain what is necessary in 
nature (through grazing, agriculture, fishing or hunting), or in other human 
groups (through piracy or through exchange). In the latter case, money emerges 
as a means of exchange of general acceptance that exceeds barter in efficiency by 
solving the problem of the double coincidence of needs. The chrematistic art, 
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where money takes part, is susceptible of being transformed into disordered and 
unnatural art, since the conventional nature of money allows it. When the 
chrematistic art is not properly oriented, the natural order of oikos and polis is 
put in danger. This does not happen simply because money is used in the 
exchanges, but when the end of the chrematistic art is that of mere 
accumulation. If the monetized area of human action expands according to an 
autonomous logic, not subordinated to the order of oikos and polis, money can 
corrupt spaces of action that do not belong to it and denature other arts that will 
be exercised for the exclusive purpose of profit, thus diverting them from their 
natural end. The result is the alteration of the natural order on which family 
and political continuity depends. This is the substantive criticism that underlies 
Aristotle’s desire for profit -for increasing wealth- and which is present in 
various forms in much of the later economic and social thought [15]. 
 
According to the above, there is a type of commercial activity and of monetized 
exchanges serving the limited and natural purposes of the oikos, which is part of 
the natural chrematistics. In fact, the use of a shoe as an object of exchange is a 
use of the shoe as such, but it is not its natural use (Pol. I, 9, 1257a 6-18), since 
it was not made to be exchanged [16]. The exchange cannot be an end: it is an 
activity whose final purpose lies in the use within the oikos of what is 
exchanged. The unnatural, merely accumulative, chrematistics corrupts the link 
between all production and its end, which is its use by the oikos (although 
Aristotle could not ignore the fact that the shoe will be acquired by someone who 
will give it its natural use, and that this is the final cause of production oriented 
to exchange for money). However, Aristotle’s analysis goes beyond the usual 
assertion that the end of production is consumption. Consumption, the mere use 
of goods, although necessary to live, is not an end in itself. Living as a proper 
purpose of the oikos makes sense in a whole that is the polis, its ultimate 
purpose being to live well. Contemplating chrematistics as part of a social order, 
the problem would be both an unnatural -disordered- accumulation because a 
means is improperly constituted in an end, and an alteration of a natural 
hierarchy of spaces of action with a corrosive effect on oikos and polis. 
Accordingly, a coherent picture of relations between spaces of action -politics, 
economy and chrematistics- is established, and consequently a hierarchical 
ordering of the agents’ plans when they operate within them [17]. On the 
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ordering of the ends, it was already stated that oikos seeks to live, polis to live 
well, and chrematistics to acquire ‘outside the oikos’ the means that families 
need to live [18]. Ethics is dedicated to ‘living well’, which in turn informs 
politics and the economy. 
 
But what exactly is the ‘living well’ of the polis? The highest good, the ultimate 
goal of all action, is happiness (eudaimonia  [19]), and this results from the 
exercise of the virtues, especially wisdom, which complete the willingness of 
man to fully realize his nature, although some external goods, goods of the body, 
and goods of the soul are also necessary (Nic. Eth. I, 8, 1099b 1-9). Virtues are 
perfecting habits that conform to a due proportion - the golden mean. Among 
them, the highest rank corresponds to the intellectual or dianoetic -art, science, 
prudence, wisdom and intellect- while, among the moral virtues, justice stands 
out. Prudence, which is sometimes considered as a moral virtue, is the practical 
wisdom that deliberates on the goodness of the end, the means to achieve it, and 
what is good for living well in general (Nic. Eth. VI, 5, 1140a 25-30). It is the 
virtue of the managers and the rulers (Nic. Eth. VI, 5, 1140b 10). Justice is the 
most excellent of virtues since whoever possesses it can make use of the virtues 
with others, that is, to orient their action to the good of others preserving 
happiness or its elements (Nic. Eth. V, 1, 1129b 15-20). Therefore, justice, more 
than a virtue, is the whole virtue, and consequently injustice is not a part of 
vice, but the whole vice (Nic. Eth. V, 1, 1130a 5-10). 
 
Aristotle divides justice into the particular and the general. Within the first, 
corrective justice refers to the relations between the members of the polis as 
equals. This equality must be preserved in the various dealings [20] among 
people. Also, belonging to particular justice, distributive justice refers to what 
the polis owes its members proportionately as they contribute in a different way 
to the good of the polis, for example, by the recognition of merits or honors. A 
special type of relationship between members of the polis is reciprocity. The 
reciprocally proportionate actions keep the polis united. Within reciprocity, 
exchange mediated by money is included. Money allows the equalization of the 
unequal through necessity [21]. Money, a conventional measure established by 
virtue of an agreement, solves the problem of the commensurability necessary for 
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such equalization, at least to a sufficient degree, by acting as a substitute for 
necessity (Nic. Eth. V, 5, 1133a 15-30). 
 
The general justice refers to the relation of the members of the polis to the polis 
itself, and is also called political justice. This is only possible between free and 
equal people (Nic. Eth. V, 6, 1134a 25-30), so it differs from domestic justice. 
Political justice can be natural or legal. Natural justice has the same force 
everywhere and is not subject to human opinion, whereas legal justice is 
distinguished by its promulgation, or by application to particular cases (Nic. 
Eth. V, 7, 1134b 20-25). In short, justice acts in three directions: first, linking 
equals to each other through corrective justice; second, to the polis with respect 
to its members through distributive justice; and third, to its members with 
respect to the polis itself through political justice. 
 
Summarizing, the continuity of the polis is not ensured through the 
authoritarian imposition [22] of an external social order that enforces justice in 
order to procure eudaimonia for men, but it is these who maintain the being of 
the polis through the ‘decentralized’ exercise of the virtues. Virtues tend to 
generate orderly actions compatible with the conservation of the political and 
family being. More precisely, the disordered exercise of chrematistics is one of 
the causes that can alter this natural social order by diverting the exercise of the 
various arts and of politics from their natural end. Justice, in all its 
specifications, is responsible for maintaining the natural equality of citizens on 
which the unity of the polis is based. The social order as a natural order is 
maintained as such, not by necessity external to human acts or by coercive 
imposition, but thanks to virtuous human actions that seeks perfection 
according to the place that everyone occupies in polis and oikos. Of course, it is 
possible to act non-virtuously, but we cannot speak of the existence of a polis, an 
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Practical reason, economic activity and  
chrematistics in St. Thomas 
 
Practical reason and law 
The extension of ‘the economy’ to other spheres of human action, in addition to 
the family, comes from the very generality of the rational rule that governs the 
oikos. Ordering or assigning consists in putting in its place (Singer, 1958), in 
properly arranging the constituent parts of a particular entity so that it is able to 
fulfil its own natural purpose in the best possible way. ‘The economy’ of the 
human action is then that dimension which consists in ordering, assigning, 
managing, coordinating, planning, governing, distributing any means, resources 
or activities in a certain space of action -ambit of sociability- for the 
achievement of any goal or target, that is, an intended totality or entity. The 
intended totality requires that certain means, resources or activities are 
available at precise times according to what the agent considers the course of 
action most adequate to attain it. Hence, it is necessary to speak of a plan of 
action (Rubio de Urquía, 2005) as an idealized or imagined configuration of acts 
that run in the future -the devised action, necessarily, is always placed in the 
future- to arrive at something as close as possible to the intended totality. 
 
This imagined configuration of a totality follows a rational norm (i.e. a 
‘rational rule of action’) is not random or unfathomable, but intelligible: we can 
know the reason why people think what they think and do what they do. This is 
precisely the fundamental intellectual finding that makes economics a science of 
action. The ‘action theorist’ -the economist is really a praxeologist in von Mises’s 
terminology- can characterize the rational norm in very different ways, 
although the ideal is to replicate the rational norm actually employed by the 
agent, if the praxeologist has to explain his action. In this process, the 
anthropological assumptions explicitly or implicitly adopted by the praxeologist 
play a fundamental role. For example, the first indisputable and obvious precept 
of natural law for St. Thomas is that ‘every agent acts for an end under the 
aspect of good’ (Summa I-II, q. 94, a. 2), which can be considered as the first 
axiom of action. In addition to principles such as the one just quoted, other 
characteristic features that produce as many economic theories as 
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anthropological models one can imagine are also necessary (Rubio de Urquía, 
2000, 2005). Thus, the whole of the law constitutes for St. Thomas a set of 
‘positive-normative’ principles that characterize a type of action based on a 
Christian anthropological model. 
 
If we turn to the concept of law according to St. Thomas, we find that the law is 
simultaneously ordering or disposition of the being -form-, and external 
orientation towards the good, that is, the way in which God instructs for the 
good. The law is ‘rule and measure’, good ordering or arrangement of the parts to 
fulfil the own natural end of a certain entity. Therefore, things follow a rational 
norm or reason, and their law lies precisely in this fact. As long as the law is 
known, it can also be called a rational norm or reason, although the ‘rule and 
measure’ of different things is not cognoscible in the same way, and the practical 
reason must be differentiated from the speculative reason. Human nature is 
ready to fulfil the end to which man is called. Intellect and will orient 
themselves, as their general objects, towards the truth and the good, respectively, 
allowing us to comprehend in the order of Creation its reason for being -the 
nature of things- in which its good also resides. It is possible, therefore, to adapt 
action -plans of action- to the truth and the good by adjusting its rational norm 
to the law, as far as possible and in a perfective process, that is to say, to the ‘rule 
and measure’ of the things to which our action is oriented. 
 
Aristotle separates practical philosophy (ethics, politics, and economics) from 
speculative philosophy, unlike Plato, who conceives all ideas subordinated to the 
idea of good and, in coherence with it, establishes a unique body of knowledge 
that is philosophy itself. Hence, to fulfil that idea, philosopher kings must rule 
his utopian republic, without families or private property. For Aristotle and St. 
Thomas, on the other hand, the relation between the universal and the 
particular is different for human affairs and for the irrational entities. The 
problems of practical philosophy differ from those of speculative philosophy, so 
‘For among statements about conduct those which are general apply more widely, 
but those which are particular are more genuine, since conduct has to do with 
individual cases, and our statements must harmonize with the facts in these 
cases’ (Nic. Eth. II, 7, 1107a 31-33). In this context, the mechanical application 
of general principles is not valid: ‘The general account being of this nature, the 
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account of particular cases is yet more lacking in exactness; for they do not fall 
under any art or precept but the agents themselves must in each case consider 
what is appropriate to the occasion, as happens also in the art of medicine or of 
navigation’ (Nic. Eth. II, 2, 1104a 5-10). 
 
St. Thomas continues with this distinction. Speculative reason and practical 
reason proceed from the common to the particular (Summa I-II, q. 94, a. 4) 
although in a different way. Speculative reason is about necessary things, and its 
common principles and particular conclusions express truths without exception. 
Practical reason deals with human actions that are contingent and in whose 
common principles a certain need is found, but where more exceptions occur as 
more is descended to the particular. In the practical order, unlike the speculative 
one, truth or practical rectitude is not the same for all men concerning 
particular knowledge, although it is when referring to the common or universal 
principles of natural law. In the context of this work, we could interpret this 
truth or practical rectitude as the simultaneous feasibility and goodness of the 
action plans. 
 
As a rational rule of the action, the law –‘rule and measure’- is not only the 
competence of the legislator or the magistrate, but also falls under the 
responsibility of the oikonomos, oikonomos being understood as any agent with 
managerial capacity (head of household, ruler, merchant, artisan...) or any other 
person who plans or decides on their own particular affairs. When an agent 
plans his action, he does not radically separate ‘moral issues’ from ‘material 
issues’. The natural way the human being elaborates his plans of action is by 
mixing in his considerations what is factually possible and morally good, both 
according to his personal appreciations. The Thomist conception of the law fits 
precisely with this way of proceeding because in the nature of each being lies its 
good, which is discovered as far as possible and according to the various 
circumstances of the acting agent. In a similar way, each agent mixes 
considerations about what is and what it ought to be, while whether or not he 
does this properly is a different matter. In current terms, we would say that it is 
almost impossible for an agent both thinking and acting ‘free from value 
judgements’, given that, ultimately, the law relates both types of considerations. 
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The Thomist concept of law can be at the same time sufficiently general and 
precise as the set of elements about the being and the ‘ought to be’ that agents 
take into account when elaborating their plans of action. Without further 
detail, under the general coverage of the eternal law, four types of law are 
considered ordered according as the degree of necessity affects them. The 
absolute need affects irrational entities (‘God imprints on the whole of nature 
the principles of its proper actions’, Summa I-II, q. 93, a. 5, the ‘laws of nature’ 
in today’s terms). Certain need is found in the common or universal principles of 
the natural law whose promulgation consists in the very fact of being inscribed 
in the minds of men (Summa I-II, q. 94, a. 6). Unlike natural law, divine law is 
not fully knowable by natural reason alone and therefore it has been revealed to 
men by the love of God. 
 
A decreasing necessity corresponds with an increasing contingency: for the 
practical reason, more exceptions occur the further one descends from the 
general to the particular. The human law must address a high degree of 
particularity and contingency. According to his famous definition, human law is 
‘an ordinance of reason for the common good, made by him who has care of the 
community, and promulgated’ (Summa I-II, q. 90, a. 4). If it is genuine law, 
comes from the natural law and obliges in conscience. Any institution, as any 
predictable pattern of social behaviour, formal or informal, would also be 
considered as human law. In this regard, St. Thomas says about custom that ‘for 
when a thing is done again and again, it seems to proceed from a deliberate 
judgement of reason. Accordingly, custom has the force of a law, abolishes law, 
and is the interpreter of law’ (Summa I-II, q. 97, a. 3). Finally, the top level of 
contingency corresponds to the individual actions ‘because the decrees of prudent 
men are made for the purpose of directing individual actions; whereas law is a 
general precept’ (Suma I-II, q. 96, a. 1, reply to the 2nd objection). In short, ‘in 
contingent matters, such as natural and human things, it is enough for a thing 
to be certain, as being true in the greater number of instances, though at times 
and less frequently it fail’ (Suma I-II, q. 96, a. 1, reply to the 3rd objection). 
 
Notwithstanding its Aristotelian framework, the vision of man’s destiny and the 
Christian sense of existence introduces a radical difference with respect to 
Aristotelian thought: to live in this world is to be on the way to our salvation 
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through Christ. This entails the fulfilment of the precepts -which are also of 
natural law- and the aspiration to evangelical perfection, both facilitated by the 
virtues and the help of grace. Important consequences are derived from this 
vision: every man is part of a perfect community -in the sense of polis- and the 
law is (and ‘ought to be’, according to what has been said) ordered toward 
common happiness (Summa I-II, q. 90, a. 2). As the ultimate goal of the human 
community is the salvation of each one of its members, the law is primarily 
directed to this. Thus, the Aristotelian conception of the common good is 
subsumed under the Christian one of salvation because the best common good for 
a community is the salvation of its members. St. Thomas maintains the specific 
difference between the political and the family communities. In this sense, he 
affirms that the good of the domestic society is directed to the good of the polis 
(Summa I-II, q. 90, a. 3, reply to the 3rd objection). In short, the law in its four 
specifications (eternal, divine, natural and human) acts as a positive-normative 
principle -rule and measure- of all human action in its various spaces of action, 
in hierarchical order: ethical-political, familiar-economic, and chrematistic-
productive. A religious fourth level of Christian nature with hierarchical 
priority is added. The hierarchical ordering of spaces of action is also natural 
according to the natural tendencies of man: seeking life and the means of life, 
living well and seeking God. Therefore, there is a hierarchy of value or priority 
always in force, which becomes explicit in case of conflict between the different 
levels. 
 
Attitude towards temporal goods 
The general attitude towards temporal goods depends on the life chosen, 
contemplative or active, since, under the first, evangelical counsels are 
prescriptive, whereas in the active life the degree of perfection to which each one 
aspires determines the degree of rigour in its compliance. In any case, the 
precepts of the law bind everyone equally. The praxis about temporal goods is 
subject to the virtues. Thus, in relation to charity, St. Thomas analyzes 
almsgiving and for that reason, what is ‘necessary’ to live. The solicitude for 
material goods and for tomorrow lies under the virtue of prudence. In addition, 
following Aristotle, property and mercantile dealings -trading and usury- are to 
be regarded under the virtue of justice, so that ‘economic issues’ -more correctly, 
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chrematistic issues- are conceived as ‘the fair economic issues’. We turn now to 
St. Thomas’s treatment of these topics. 
 
St. Thomas agrees with Aristotle in pointing out the instrumental character of 
wealth and in condemning the unnatural chrematistics for converting a means 
into an end. Additionally, he also rejects the idea that enrichment ought to be an 
objective of action because it can divert man from what must be his ultimate 
goal. In fact, natural wealth fills in the weaknesses of nature -they are 
livelihoods- so they are means and not the ultimate end. And artificial riches, 
such as money -the measure of tradable things invented to facilitate exchange- 
that are sought to acquire the natural ones, still less are the ultimate end 
(Summa I-II, q. 2, a. 1). The desire for natural riches is finite because the needs 
of nature have a limit, but the desire for artificial riches, slave of a disordered 
concupiscence, does not have one (Summa I-II, q. 2, a. 1, reply to the 3rd 
objection). Neither honours, fame, power, nor any good of the body or the soul -
as internal good of the soul, because the salvation is an external good- pleasure 
or created good, are the ultimate end of man. The ultimate and perfect bliss is 
the vision of the divine essence (beatitudo). 
 
Thus, economic activity -as chrematistics- is the relation of man to external 
goods and is subordinated to his ultimate goal, which is his salvation. The 
ultimate Aristotelian goal is a mundane happiness consisting in the 
contemplation of the being for which external goods are required, as St. Thomas 
states, ‘either for the support of the animal body; or for certain operations which 
belong to human life, which we perform by means of the animal body’ (Summa 
I-II, q. 4, a. 7). For a Christian, it is possible in this world to enjoy an imperfect 
bliss (felicitas), correlate of the Aristotelian eudaimonia, which the external 
goods instrumentally serve. However, perfect bliss, which consists in the 
contemplation of God (beatitudo), the ultimate end of man, does not need any 
external good. The virtues, as inner goods, facilitate human action to be ordered 
according to that. Thus, we have a hierarchy of ends that order action: perfect 
bliss is ultramundane and the ultimate referent of worldly life. And within 
worldly life, we can aspire to an imperfect bliss, from both the contemplative 
life of the religious status and the active life based on virtues. The active life 
requires more external goods than the contemplative life, which is preferable 
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and more demanding, because in the religious status certain rules that, in the 
active life, are councils of perfection, not precepts, must be assumed as 
mandatory. 
 
In fact, the contemplative life is better than the active life (Summa II-II, q. 182, 
a. 1). Aquinas accepts the eight reasons given by Aristotle (Nic. Eth. X, 7 and 8) 
to which he provides a theological sustenance, and, he says, the Lord adds a 
ninth (Luke 10:42), stating that ‘Mary hath chosen the best part, which shall not 
be taken away from her’, Mary -as opposed to Martha- being the symbol of the 
contemplative life. And quoting St. Augustine (De Verbis Domini Sermones 
ciii)), he will say ‘the burden of necessity shall at length be taken from thee: 
whereas the sweetness of truth is eternal’. By imposition of the present life, in 
specific cases, it is necessary to choose the active life, but in an added way 
without abandoning what was already possessed. The contemplative life is more 
meritorious than the active life (Summa II-II, q. 182, a. 2). While the root of all 
merit is charity that consists in the love of God and neighbour, it is more 
meritorious to love God, the end of the contemplative life. The active life is 
dedicated to present works: to address the needs of our fellow man. However, it 
may happen that one man deserves in the active life more than another in the 
contemplative if, because of the abundance of his love for God, he temporarily 
gives up contemplation to love his neighbour. Work -as an external- is 
characteristic of the active life, which is a sign of charity -as love of neighbour- 
but it is ‘a much more expressive sign’ to abandon everything relative to this life 
and to dedicate oneself to divine contemplation alone (Summa II-II, q. 182, a. 2, 
reply to the 1st objection). An active life that directs and orders the passions of 
the soul is not a hindrance to the contemplative life, but can help contemplation 
which is impossible because of the lack of order of internal passions. Quoting St. 
Gregory (Moral VI) it is necessary to exercise good works and to let go of the 
desire for temporal goods, to contemplate spiritual things without ‘shadows of 
the things corporeal’. 
 
What about the solicitude for material goods and for the future? Concerning the 
virtue of prudence, we find the following. As a kind of prudence ordered to the 
government of the multitude, economic prudence is considered, along with 
political and legislative prudence (Summa II-II, q. 50, a. 3). The family occupies 
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an intermediate place between the person and the polis or kingdom. Riches are 
instruments, while the ultimate goal of economic prudence encompasses the 
totality of living well in the manifestations of family life. The solicitude for 
temporal things may be unlawful [23] for three reasons: that the temporal things 
be sought as an end, because of an excessive desire for the temporal things that 
leads to depart from the spiritual, and by an exaggerated fear (Summa II-II, q. 
55, a. 6). However, if we do what is our duty, the greater solicitude for spiritual 
goods will bring the temporal ones according to our need. This is due to the 
greater benefits God grants to man without his intervention, such as body and 
soul, protection over animals and plants, and divine providence. The 
unnecessary solicitude, which troubles the soul, must be abandoned (Matthew 
6:31: ‘So do not worry and say, “What are we to eat?” or “What are we to drink?” 
or “What are we to wear?”’). Concerning the solicitude for the future (Matthew 
6:34: ‘Do not worry about tomorrow’), St. Thomas quotes Ecclesiastes 3:1: ‘There 
is an appointed time for everything’, which includes both external works and the 
internal solicitude. A due foresight for the future corresponds to the virtue of 
prudence, ‘Our Lord does not condemn those who according to human custom, 
provide themselves with such things, but those who oppose themselves to God for 
the sake of these things’ (St. Augustine, De Sermone Domini In Monte) (Summa 
II-II, q. 55, a. 7). 
 
The necessary things and almsgiving 
St. Thomas delves into the external goods that families need to live, which 
served to Aristotle to distinguish natural chrematistics from the non-natural. 
Necessary things include the normal requirements of the condition and the 
status of one’s own person. This analysis is performed in the treatise on charity 
dedicated to alms. According to the fundamental precept of the New Law, 
charity consists first in the love of God, and secondarily in the love of 
neighbour. Proper to charity is that we want what is good and accomplish it. 
Works of mercy can be prescriptive or counselled according to the degree of 
perfection with which we comply with the New Law. Alms is understood, in a 
general sense, as any act of mercy and, more specifically, as ways to help the 
needy with external goods (Summa II-II, q. 32, a. 1). 
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St. Thomas says that almsgiving helps those in need, and the indigent receives 
for the love of God, it being an act of charity through mercy. The diversity of 
alms is based on the diversity of deprivations in the neighbour (Summa II-II, q. 
32, a. 2), either of the body, or of the soul, and for these there are the various 
works of mercy. So almsgiving is not limited to sharing material riches, but to 
acting according to acts of mercy through the donation of bodily and spiritual 
goods (Summa II-II, q. 32, a. 3). Spiritual alms surpass the corporeal ones, 
although in particular cases, like someone dying of hunger, it is necessary to 
feed him before teaching him. Bodily almsgiving has a spiritual effect on the 
one who gives, because it is given out of love for God and neighbour, and in one 
who receives who feels moved to pray for his benefactor (Summa II-II, q. 32, a. 
4). 
 
Since love of one’s neighbour is prescriptive, we must both love and seek for his 
good (Summa II-II, q. 32, a. 5), which implies helping him in his needs. Giving 
alms is necessary for virtue as required by the right reason. This implies two 
types of relationship, regarding he who gives and he who receives. In the person 
who gives, what is to be given in alms must be superfluous for oneself and for 
those who are in his charge, and this according to his condition and rank. This 
is how nature acts: first, she seeks what is necessary for her sustenance, while 
she spends the rest on the formation of other new beings. And for he who 
receives, he must be effectively in a state of necessity, and since ‘it is not possible 
for one individual to relieve the needs of all, we are not bound to relieve all who 
are in need, but only those who could not be succoured if we not did succour 
them’. What is judged as superfluous in who gives and as necessary in who 
receives must be according to the ordinary probabilities (Summa II-II, q. 32, a. 
5, reply to the 3rd objection), that is, with the due solicitude for tomorrow. 
Arising from these conditions, it is advisable to give alms, although not 
prescriptive. 
 
Underneath the superfluous, the range of what is necessary according to the 
normal requirements of the condition and the status of the person himself and 
of those he has in his care is broad. It can be added to substantially without 
exceeding the limit of what is necessary, or substantially diminished while 
remaining enough to develop life in a way appropriate to the status itself 
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(Summa II-II, q. 32, a. 6). Giving alms within that range is counselled, but not 
prescriptive. It would even be disorderly to give to the point of going below that 
limit that allows a life according to the status. The exceptions regarding not 
giving alms of what is necessary are the change of status, such as entry into 
religion since this is demanded as an act of perfection; or that the given things 
are easily recovered and serious inconveniences are not entailed; or in case of 
extreme need of the private person or the State. 
 
Property, trading and justice 
Like Aristotle, St. Thomas analyses property, trading, and usury -chrematistic 
issues- in relation to the virtue of justice, specifically commutative justice. 
Within the virtues, justice orders action in things which are related to someone 
else (Summa II-II, q. 58, a. 2). He defines it as ‘a habit whereby a man renders 
to each one his due by a constant and perpetual will’ (Summa II-II, q. 58, a. 1). 
The virtue makes both the human act and he who carries it out good, and cannot 
be good if it does not fulfil spontaneously and willingly. There can be no justice 
that is not virtuous (Summa II-II, q. 58, a. 3, reply to the 1st and 3rd objections), 
or external works fair in themselves, since external works correspond to doing, 
whereas virtues deal with actions, regardless of whether justice falls on things or 
involves the performance of external acts (justice is a virtuous praxis although it 
involves the performance of external works, see endnote 18 on praxis and 
poiesis). 
 
Justice is a general virtue, since -following Aristotle- any virtue can belong to 
justice, while this directs to the common good (Summa II-II, q. 58, a. 6). Since 
to ordain to the common good corresponds to the law, one can speak of legal 
justice, because by means of it, man agrees with the law that directs the acts of 
all the virtues towards the good. St. Thomas establishes a parallel between 
justice and charity, both of which direct the acts of the other virtues and, 
because of this, they are general virtues: justice to the common good, charity to 
the divine good (Summa II-II, q. 58, a. 6). Besides the general justice oriented to 
the common good, it is possible to consider the particular justice, oriented to the 
good of another person in particular. By analogy, it is also possible to speak of 
another kind of justice -economic justice- which is not justice in its perfect 
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sense, and which would apply to the family community as an intermediate 
community (Summa II-II, q. 58, a. 7, reply to the 3rd objection). 
 
Aquinas deals with the subject of property in question 66 on theft and robbery. 
The external things, as to their nature, are not subject to human power, but to 
the divine power to which all beings obey. But as for their use, man can use 
them because imperfect beings exist for the sake of the most perfect, their 
domain being, therefore, natural. The domain is due to his reason, in which 
resides the image of God (Summa II-II, q. 66, a. 1). As for the disposition and 
management of external goods, it is allowed for man to possess his own things 
(Summa II-II, q. 66, a. 2) for three reasons: i) each one is more solicitous in 
what is his own than in what is common; ii) it is administered in a more orderly 
way without having to care for everything indiscriminately, confusion then 
reigning; and iii) because the state of peace among men is maintained if 
everyone is happy with what is theirs: disputes appear more frequently in what 
is common. This use does not imply that external things are taken as one’s own, 
but as common, so that they are easily shared for the needs of others. Hence, if 
one appropriates something that was common at the beginning, he should not 
deprive others of its use (Summa II-II, q. 66, a. 2, reply to the 2nd objection). 
The distinction of possessions does not come from natural right, but from 
positive, but this does not imply that natural law is opposed to private property. 
Property is a development of natural law made by human reason for convenience 
for the reasons expounded (Summa II-II, q. 66, a. 2, reply to the 1st objection). 
 
According to the ordering of external things for the satisfaction of the needs of 
men, which is by natural law, appropriation, which takes place by positive law, 
should not prevent men’s necessities from being met. So, if the necessity is 
evident and urgent, it is approved to take the things of others, manifestly or in a 
hidden way, and this cannot be considered to be theft or robbery (Summa II-II, 
q. 66, a. 7). The distribution of one’s own things is left to the discretion of each, 
to assist those who suffer need, since they are many and they cannot all be 
helped with the same thing, although superfluous goods are owed to the 
sustenance of the poor by natural law [24]. In case of extreme necessity, it is 
authorized to take from someone else if one who wants to give cannot be found: 
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even the depositary can give of what is not his own if there is no other better 
means (Summa II-II, q. 32, a. 7, reply to the 3rd objection). 
 
Within the voluntary transactions, St. Thomas considers circumstances that 
could make trading fraudulent, being considered in that case like theft or 
robbery [25] . There are three aspects to be dealt with: i) unfair selling by reason 
of price; ii) injustice by reason of the thing sold; and iii) increasing in price 
respect to the cost of acquisition when trading. 
 
i) To the first question (Summa II-II, q.77, a.1), that is, if it is morally approved 
to sell a thing more expensively than it is worth, the reply is clear: selling above 
the fair price [26] is sin because the neighbour is deceived and damaged. For the 
seller to place a bidder that raises the price, or the buyer another who pushes 
price down (quoting Tulio) are also sin. That is, any type of fraud that changes 
the price is unlawful. Excluding fraud and in essence, trading seems to be 
instituted in the interests of both parties by mutual necessity. The contract must 
be based on the equality of the thing and it should not damage one party more 
than the other. The value is set in monetary terms, and hence it must take into 
account whether the price exceeds or does not cover the value of the thing, which 
would be unfair. Therefore, from this analysis of Aquinas, and excluding fraud, 
the problem lies in determining the fair price, that is, that which equals the 
value of the thing. 
 
In addition to the essence, it is necessary to consider the circumstances that 
could accidentally make a sale unfair because one of the parties received profit 
and the other harm. This happens when someone has a great need of the thing 
he is going to give up, or when someone receives a great benefit from the thing 
he is going to acquire: 
a) In case of harm to the seller for giving the thing away, the price may be 
greater than the value of the thing -as a compensation- but not greater than the 
value it has for the holder. 
b) A great benefit that the buyer can obtain without harm to the seller does not 
justify a price higher than the value of the thing, since the seller cannot charge 
for something that does not belong to him [27], that is, the benefit that the buyer 
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receives as a result of his own circumstances. Although, out of honesty, the buyer 
could spontaneously give the seller something else. 
 
The fact that the price is determined by civil laws does not make lawful that 
buyers and sellers try to ‘deceive each other’ (Summa II-II, q. 77, a. 1, reply to 
the 1st objection). Human laws are given to the people, where many who lack 
virtue are mixed with others virtuous. Laws cannot prohibit everything contrary 
to virtue, only what destroys social coexistence. The not prohibited things are 
legal, but not because they are morally approved but because they are not 
punished. Thus, excluding fraud, buyers and sellers can buy and sell for a price 
greater or lower than the value of the thing, provided that the difference not be 
excessive. A difference is considered excessive, according to human law, when 
the price passes half the fair price, in either direction (Summa II-II, q. 77, a. 1, 
reply to the 1st objection, quoting Codex Iustinianus 4.44.2). In that case, there 
is an obligation to pay back. It happens that the fair price is not determined 
precisely, but is fixed by a ‘rough estimate’ that does not destroy the equality 
required by justice. 
 
The desire to sell as expensively as possible and purchase as cheaply as possible 
should not be considered as natural, but as vicious, remaining applicable what 
was said about the fair price (Summa II-II, q. 77, a. 1, reply to the 2nd 
objection). Finally, when there is a useful friendship between buyer and seller, 
one should not take into account the equality of the thing when setting the price, 
but the equality of benefits (Summa II-II, q. 77, a. 1, reply to the 3rd objection). 
 
ii) When there is a defect in the thing sold with the knowledge of the seller, the 
sale is unfair and gives right to restitution, whether that defect be in the nature, 
quantity or quality of the thing (Summa II-II, q. 77, a. 2). If the seller is not 
aware of this he does not sin because the action in itself is not unfair. However, 
when he had knowledge of it, he would be obliged to redress this. The same 
would apply to a buyer who pays less than the genuine value without the seller’s 
knowledge. There is no exception if the thing sold, even if defective, can fulfil 
what the buyer really wanted; neither because of the diversity of measures 
existing in different places; nor because of a lack of knowledge about the 
Cendejas Bueno, José Luis (2017), 'Economics, chrematistics, oikos and polis 
in Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas ', The Journal of Philosophical Economics: 
Reflections on Economic and Social Issues, X: 2, 5-46 
 
The Journal of Philosophical Economics X: 2 (2017)                                               29  
ultimate nature of what is sold: sufficient knowledge about the suitability of the 
thing sold is enough. 
 
It is unlawful to occasion injury or damage to someone, such as is committed by 
a seller who sells defective merchandise without a price reduction, or if the 
defect can make the use of the thing harmful. The seller is required to disclose 
such defects (Summa II-II, q. 77, a. 3). If the defect is evident and there is a 
proportional reduction in the price, the seller is not obliged to disclose the 
defect. The fourth objection in which the seller is aware of a future price 
decrease due to a greater influx of sellers is worth pointing out. In this case, due 
to the duty to justice, he does not have to reveal that foreseen price decrease, 
which would cause him harm, but he would practice a more perfect virtue if he 
did so or reduced the price. 
 
iii) Trading itself is not unlawful. The vices of commerce are those of man and 
not those of the art, says Aquinas quoting St. Augustine (Summa II-II, q. 77, a. 
4). St. Thomas repeats Aristotle’s arguments about trade, although he differs on 
a fundamental point. Exchange can be natural, either through barter or through 
money, when it takes place to meet the needs of life. The heads of household or 
civil servants exercise this trade. Even so, trade in itself implies a certain 
debasement. However, although trade in its essence lacks an honest or necessary 
element, there is nothing vicious or opposed to virtue [28]. Profit can be ordered 
to a necessary or even honest purpose. This happens when the moderate profit 
goes to the support of the family, to help the needy, or if the trade serves the 
public interest to provide the country with necessary things. In this case, profit 
is no longer sought as an end in itself, but it consists in the remuneration for 
work. 
 
Indeed, in the reply to the first objection (Summa II-II, q. 77, a. 4) St. Thomas 
states that it is lawful to sell at a higher price for which the merchandise was 
acquired if it had been improved by labour -in that case, the price would appear 
as the price of labour- or if the profit is not sought as an ultimate end, but in 
order to another necessary or honest aim. In the reply to the second objection, he 
declares it lawful to sell more expensively if this is not what was sought, i.e., if 
whoever benefits from what we would call today an increase in equity value does 
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so as a consequence of improvements in the thing; variations in the price caused 
by differences of time and place; or from the danger of transporting from one 
place to another. That is, wrongdoing happens when profit is the exclusive and 
final purpose: when it is sold more expensively than it cost without anything 
being added or when no circumstance has changed. 
 
Clerics are required not only not to do things that are bad to the rest of men, but 
also other things regarded as commerce (Summa II-II, q. 77, a. 4, reply to the 
3rd objection). Clerics should despise earthly profit and refrain from an activity 
in which vice often appears. In addition, commerce binds the spirit to temporal 
things away from spiritual things. However, they can buy or sell to meet the 





A common feature in Aristotle’s and St. Thomas’s thoughts, also present in 
scholastics, is the ordering of the various spaces of human action. This order 
basically seeks that the actions of the agents are viable (i. e. efficient) and good. 
This is achieved because the objectives of action, in practice, transcend its local 
level and refer to a space of action of superior rank. In this way, there is no 
juxtaposition of levels with the possibility of inconsistencies between them, what 
could lead, for example, to confront oikos with polis, but, on the contrary, social 
order prevails. A vision based on the coherent integration of spaces of action, 
suitably adopted to extremely complex societies like the present ones, would 
allow explanatory gains in economic science and more efficient actions. This is 
because the problems facing States, families and economies are usually caused by 
inconsistencies between spaces of action: the ends that agents pursue within the 
different contexts of sociability, frequently, are mutually incompatible. In brief, 
what Aristotle and St. Thomas do is to analyse a framework of sociability that, 
because of its natural character, allows the viability of human action in its 
various sociability environments. 
 
As seen, in the Greek world, the object of economics is the ordering of the 
personal and material means of the family to its natural end: ensure both life 
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and the means of life. The natural social order conceived by Aristotle places the 
political community as a broader space for coexistence whose goal is to live well 
according to the virtues, emphasizing justice as the complete virtue. Natural 
chrematistics corresponds to a subordinated place as an art of acquiring at the 
service of the oikos. Its purpose is to seek the means of life by taking them from 
nature or through natural exchange. In the Aristotelian ideal, natural trading 
has a very limited presence: it should not occupy a prominent place in the life of 
the polis, because it threatens its continuity, and neither does it constitute an 
ideal of personal life. The citizen is freed from the urge to live thanks to his 
oikos, so that he can devote himself to nobler activities such as politics and 
philosophy, that is, to a virtuous praxis and to the contemplation of being. 
To the Aristotelian scheme based on the polis and the oikos, the Christian êthos 
adds a superior religious space of action, which not only affects those in the 
religious status, but also informs the totality of spaces: political, economic (as a 
family issue), and chrematistic-productive by directing all the acts, interior and 
exterior, to the ultimate end of man. This orientation occurs according to the 
eternal law which is the order of Creation that man freely accepts. The Thomist 
conception of law as ‘reason and measure’, in addition to ‘instruction for good’ 
embodied in the particular things, compels the Christian to ensure his action is 
informed by the whole law. 
 
The configuration of the totality of human acts, besides aspiring to the 
perfection of the evangelical law, passes through acceptance of the law, which 
consists in not sinning, that is, in adhering to the precepts of the divine law. The 
law, all of it, harmonizes the divine plan of salvation with the natural law and 
human things when men allow themselves to be instructed, so progressing in the 
knowledge of the natural law. The divine law, known by revelation, incorporates 
the natural, potentially knowable by all, including non-Christians, although in 
all its implications this knowledge can be laborious and conditioned in various 
ways. For its part, human law, which must stem from and be consistent with the 
natural law to be considered as genuine law and not as violence, cannot penalize 
all sin, but lead to virtue, as well as be limited to external acts. It must be viable, 
which implies taking into account the imperfection and circumstances of men. 
For this reason, it is necessarily incomplete for regulating human actions, for 
which the complete framework of legalities is needed. 
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The aforementioned structure of legalities, of the utmost consistency as it is 
outlined by St. Thomas, may not be of simple application when it comes to 
configuring or judging particular actions. This difficulty is the one of practical 
reason that does not simply admit the elaboration of particular judgements, 
derived from the general ones and of quasi-mechanical application, valid for all 
personal circumstances, times and places. The articulation of legalities involves 
the simultaneous consideration of different levels of analysis, having to decide 
which is the most appropriate, or how to deal with more than one norm if that 
were the case -for example, in a problem of conscience. Neither can the 
normative scheme of legalities be reduced to two superimposed autonomous 
levels: legal (roughly, the positive law) and moral (roughly, the natural law). 
All ‘the positive legal’ has its reason for being in ‘the natural legal’, although ‘the 
natural legal’ cannot be positive legal in its integrity or in a unique way because 
of human nature itself and the diversity of circumstances. 
 
The articulation of legalities for the particular case on hand is conditioned by 
the agent’s purposes and the reason why he appeals to the law, either to regulate 
his action or that of others. For example, the working of practical reason will 
not be the same for a legislator, for a judge who sentences, for a confessor who 
counsels, or for a head of household. And the latter will not proceed in the same 
way when deciding on his business, his family or about public issues. 
The acting agent must conform his plans of action to the intended goal, and 
integrate into the plan both means and intermediate actions in an effective way 
in order to reach it. But when forming this plan, he will take into account, to a 
greater or lesser degree of conscience, all relevant law (‘laws of nature’, divine 
law, natural law, positive law) interpreted according to his individuality and 
personal circumstances. The operational environment is characterized by 
uncertainty, it imposes opportunity costs, and obeys different internal rules 
according to the space of action considered -religious, political, familiar or 
chrematistic-, and the hierarchical ordering previously outlined. The practical 
judgement finally reached is ‘a decree of a prudent man’. In short, the rational 
rule to which the agent adjusts his plans seeks the intended goal, which has the 
appearance of good -it does not have to be really good- and is normed according 
to what the agent manages to deduce from the law such as he knows it and 
interprets it according to the nature of a particular case. 
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What does the Christian êthos imply when we move into the chrematistic space 
of action? In the previous section, we have exposed the aspects that are usually 
selected as properly economic (as chrematistics) in scholastic thought: concept of 
the ‘natural necessary’, justification of property, profit motive and trading. In 
order to fully understand this analysis, which does not separate the positive 
from the normative, it should be remembered that these are questions that are 
analyzed in the context of virtues, especially justice, and that are ‘embedded’ in a 
normative framework shaped from a virtuous praxis and the evangelical 
exigency. 
 
The external goods are instrumentally necessary and deserve the due solicitude 
below the spiritual goods. The need we have of them is objective, although it is 
not a mere bodily need. The need is not only related to what is necessary for 
sustenance: it also addresses the condition and rank -recall the discussion about 
alms-, the status -civil or religious- and the type of life -active or contemplative-, 
since the religious status and the contemplative life require fewer things than 
the civil status or the active life respectively. Inasmuch as man, by nature, is a 
political animal, and also naturally seeks God, what is necessary is naturally 
necessary according to the family, political and religious dimensions, these 
being the three natural inclinations. Indeed, in Aristotle and St. Thomas what is 
natural in man is not limited to the corporeal natural, since his rationality, 
sociability and religiosity are also natural (the latter in St. Thomas). The 
‘natural necessary’ things -external goods- are derived from the natural human, 
which is simultaneously familiar, political and religious. These goods must be 
fairly obtained and prudently administered at the service of the natural ends of 
family, polis and Church. Herein lies the sense of St. Thomas’s analysis of 
property, trading and profit. 
 
Private property does not arise from natural law, but from human law, being an 
example of a human arrangement useful for life that natural law does not 
determine. These dispositions presuppose a development of natural law, but do 
not acquire the character of immutable, reserved for the common or universal 
principles of natural law. St. Thomas claims various reasons for justifying 
private property, following Aristotle closely. The special configuration of 
legalities (natural vs. human) is manifested when Aquinas affirms that we 
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should readily grant participation to others in the things we have as our own, 
since the use is common or, in case of urgent need, that it is lawful to take things 
from others. This is by natural law, not by human law. 
 
Exchanges occur in the interests of both parties by mutual need. Excluding 
fraud, people can buy and sell at a price around the true value of the thing 
(according to Schumpeter’s interpretation, a competitive price, see endnote 26). 
Although this is not lawful, in terms of human law it is tolerated with a margin. 
The fair price is not accurately determined, it is rather an approximate estimate. 
Trade also belongs to the world of strict human affairs: in itself it is neither 
honest nor vicious, although it contains some moral turpitude. A moderate profit 
is lawful if it is intended for the sustenance of the family or the needy, or if 
trade serves the public interest. That is, if it consists in a natural or necessary 
chrematistics at the service of oikos and polis, just as in Aristotle, but admitting 
a greater margin of action and social consideration. The difference between the 
selling price and the purchase price, with which the trader obtains a profit, is 
justified if there has been an improvement in the thing, so that would be the 
price of work, or if there have been circumstances that justify that alteration. 
The same distinction between natural and human legalities applies for usury: 
according to the human law is sometimes tolerated although it is unlawful. An 
additional level of legality is even introduced, that of the Old Law, to explain 
how it was permitted for the Jews to lend to foreigners, charging interest. Nor 
does the quasi-usufruct recognized by civil laws make usury lawful. It is 
permissible to borrow with interest if needed and if the lender was already 
willing to sin by lending. Of great analytical interest is the difference between a 
loan, in which the lender gives the borrower the property, and participation in a 
company, in which property is not transferred. 
 
In short, economic (as chrematistics) activity based on an Aristotelian-
Thomistic anthropological model occupies a precise place within a natural legal 
-and social- order, which gives it a sufficient moral orientation. Chrematistics 
has a natural place at the service of families and of the common good through 
the political community. Given this place, it is up to practical reason to decide 
on the truth or practical correctness in each particular case, aided by the 
pertinent configuration of legalities, which must be known. As a human issue, 
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the economy (as a family issue) serves both criteria of utility and convenience, 
and, given the ultimate purpose of man, the precept of charity and the 





[1] As a notorious anecdote, during a briefing by academics at the London 
School of Economics on the turmoil on the international markets, Queen 




[2] The integration of the different spheres of human action is present in a 
‘Mediterranean tradition’ of economic thought. Baeck (1994) considers the 
specific character of this tradition, which would also include Hebrew and 
Muslim thought. This tradition, despite its diversity, has common features such 
as the subordination of the material to the moral, the idea of the cosmos as an 
order, the moral legitimation of a hierarchical order, an organic conception of 
society and a preference for stability versus change. This Mediterranean 
paradigm would have been replaced by another Atlantic one linked to the new 





[4] Polis is the Greek city-state and, in general, any political community or 
‘republic’ (e.g. Plato’s Πολιτεία). As a political entity, it must not be confused 
with the public administration of a modern State. 
 
[5] It is also necessary to refer to the Oeconomica, a work erroneously attributed 
to Aristotle and which, along with the aforementioned work of Xenophon, had 
an important repercussion in medieval and renaissance thought (Baloglou, 
2012). The Oeconomica adds, without connection, to an essay in the line of 
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Xenophon and Aristotle, another more original idea that distinguishes four 
levels or economic systems and explains the way they obtain their resources. 
 
[6] Some do, however: Plato, Xenophon and others. Already in classical 
antiquity, “the economy” passed from referring to the family to referring to the 
finances of the polis and, in general, to the administration of persons and/or 
goods in other contexts, for example, in the army or in navigation. Until the 
eighteenth century, it was common to differentiate these fields. For example, 
Rousseau states that ‘Le mot d’Économie ou d’Oeconomie vient de οιχος, maison, 
et de νσμος, loi, et ne signifie originairement que le sage et légitime 
gouvernement de la maison, pour le bien commun de toute la famille. Le sens de 
ce terme a été dans la suite étendu au gouvernement de la grande famille, qui est 
l’État. Pour distinguer ces deux acceptions, on l’appelle dans ce dernier cas, 
économie générale, ou politique; et dans l’autre, économie domestique, ou 
particulière’ (Discours sur l’économie politique, 1758, §1). 
 
 [7] ‘For man is not merely a political but also a household-maintaining animal 
(zoon oikonomikon), and his unions are not, like those of the other animals, 
confined to certain times, and formed with any chance partner, whether male or 
female; but in a special sense man is not a lonely being, but has a tendency to 
partnership with those to whom he is by nature akin. There would, then, be 
partnership and a kind of justice, even if there were no State; and the household 
is a kind of friendship’ (Aristotle, Eudemian Ethics VII, 10, 1242a 22-28). See 
also Mirón (2004) who claims the relationship between economy and oikos 
emphasizing, in the context of the classical Greek world, the distinct role of the 
inner (female) and outer (male) spaces of the oikos. 
 
[8] The Aristotelian analysis on chrematistics together with the ‘embeddedness’ 
of the Greek economy has led many (see the formalist vs. substantivist debate, 
Polanyi, 1944) to consider that Aristotle did not have a genuine economic 
thought, since it did not exist as such ‘the economy’ as a system independent of 
other contexts of sociability, see also Baeck (1994). The approach here adopted is 
that neither ‘the economy’ reduces to the modern market economy nor economic 
theory reduces to neoclassical economic theory. Thus, Aristotelian-Thomistic 
thought contains truly economic theory. 
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[9] Essential references are Gordon (1975), Langholm (1992), and Lowry and 
Gordon (1998) among others. 
 
[10] Two good bibliographic reviews on Aristotle’s contributions to economic 
thought are found in Spiegel (1996) and Rothbard (1995). In addition to Politics 
and Nicomachean Ethics, some fragments of the Rhetoric and the Topics that 
anticipate the principle of diminishing marginal utility and the Austrian theory 
of imputation are of interest. The relationship between chrematistics, oikos and 
polis is considered to a greater or lesser extent by Amemiya (2007), Basañez 
(1994, 1995), Berthoud (2002), Crespo (2014), Cruz (1989), Gordon (1964), 
Kauder (1953), Lowry (1987) and Meikle (1995). Scalzo (2010) and Martínez-
Echevarría (2011) emphasize its central place in the Aristotelian economic 
thought. 
 
[11] In Plato (Gorgias), chrematistics is a technique that seeks to obtain wealth, 
analogously to how medicine seeks the good of the body, or justice the good of 
the soul. In The Sophist a classification of the different chrematistics is 
presented together with a moral assessment, on which Aristotle is later based. 
 
[12] Peacock (2016) argues in favour of translating ἐξὑποθέσεως as ‘by 
hypothesis’ and not as ‘by convention’, to avoid misinterpretations. Aristotle’s 
would consider money as result of a formal agreement rather than as an 
implicitly arising convention. 
 
[13] On the nature of the needs in Aristotle and his influence on the conceptions 
of Marx, see Springborg (1984). Later, we will explain what St. Thomas says 
about ‘the necessary’. 
 
[14] The parallelism between economy and unnatural chrematistics and two 
social models is clear. The traditional Greek model is inspired by a head of 
household who acts as a farmer in time of peace and as a soldier in time of war 
(as the protagonist of the Xenophon’s Oeconomicus) where the land is unsaleable 
and the labour comes from slavery. While the second model is based on 
commerce and wage labour, often exercised by foreigners who did not have 
citizen rights in their polis of residence (metics). The tension present in 
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Aristotle between a scheme of harmonious relations between polis and oikos, on 
the one hand, and chrematistics on the other, is related to the historical process 
of economic and social transformation affecting classical Greece. Without 
entering into the controversy about the agrarian or commercial character of the 
Greek world (‘primitivisms’ vs. ‘modernizers’, see Polanyi et al., 1957, pp. 3-11) 
we note the position of Finley (1970, p.18) who finds no trace of economic 
analysis in the Politics, stating that Aristotle did not consider the ‘rules or 
mechanism of trade’. On the contrary, by insisting on the unnaturalness of 
mercantile profit, he eliminated the possibility of such a discussion. The fact 
that the Greek economy was predominantly agrarian would have prevented 
Aristotle from recognizing the autonomy of ‘the economy’ (chrematistics), a 
space of action ruled by its own rules aside from those of politics or family. An 
interpretation that explains the difference between the two chrematistics is 
based on the idea that the exchange taking place in different societies or in 
different contexts of sociability is of a different nature. Natural chrematistics 
implies reciprocity, is based on friendship, entails a personal relationship, and 
unifies the polis, unlike the chrematistics that seeks profit as an end (often 
outside the polis) which dissolves it (Borisonik, 2013, 2014). 
 
[15] We see later how St. Thomas admits the two types of chrematistics and adds 
another motive for censuring the second: profit-making, like any other striving 
for temporal things, deviates from man’s ultimate end. Analyzed under the 
virtue of justice, a moderate profit earned through trade is fair if it can be 
attributed to work or other causes and if it serves the family or the political 
community. 
 
[16] Marx is inspired by Aristotle when he differentiates exchange ruled by the 
value in use in which money is a means (commodity-money-commodity) from 
exchange governed by the value of exchange in which the means is the 
commodity (money-commodity-money), that is, the simple circulation of 
commodities from the circulation of capital, respectively. The first circulation 
ends with the satisfaction of a necessity, the second has no end. 
 
[17] The people who act are always the same but when operating in different 
environments they must do so in such a way that, in case of conflict between 
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levels, the one of superior hierarchical order has priority. For example, when a 
citizen decides to sacrifice his fortune for the good of the polis if necessary 
(polis>oikos). 
 
[18] The difference between economics and chrematistics has its correlation in 
the difference between praxis and poiesis. The first refers to the immanent 
aspect of the action, that is, to those results that affect the interior of the agent, 
while the second, which could be translated as production, is a type of transitive 
action that results in something separate from the agent. Chrematistics is a 
transitive action, while the economy refers to its immanent aspect: use of 
resources to live. Human activity encompasses both aspects, praxis and poiesis. 
See Crespo, 2006, who also analyses the four approaches to ‘the economy’ present 
in Aristotle: as immanent action, ability, habit and practical science. 
 
[19] Eudaimonia can be translated as ‘fullness of being’, although commonly is 
translated as ‘happiness’. Aristotle understands it as the virtuous exercise of 
what constitutes the specifically human, that is, of reason (Nic. Eth. X, 6 and 7). 
 
[20] Whether these are voluntary (purchase, sale, loan, bail, usufruct, deposit, 
rent) or involuntary, i.e., crimes that require punishment or reparation to 
restore the equality prevailing prior to their commission. 
 
[21] A common point with corrective justice is the equalization of the things 
exchanged when, their prices being expressed in monetary terms, the problem of 
their comparability is sufficiently solved and equalization through necessity is 
possible. Reciprocity is also related to distributive justice, when taking into 
account the due proportion between the producers: ‘The number of shoes 
exchanged for a house (or for a given amount of food) must therefore correspond 
to the ratio of builder to shoemaker’ (Nic. Eth. V, 5, 1133a 22). This statement 
has given rise to multiple interpretations. It would seem that, with the 
equalization of things, distributive justice among the agents were also satisfied 
(Polanyi, 1957). Nothing points to an implicit labour theory of value. If 
shoemaker and builder exchange their products quantities 1q  and 2q  at prices 
1p  and 2p , reciprocity requires that
1 1 2 2p q p q , which implies the rule of 
proportionality that defines the relative price. Thus, the problem of 
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[22] Aristotle rebuts the utopian constitution of Plato’s Republic. He is against 
possessing everything in common -goods, women and children- by the care that 
everyone takes with what is theirs and the increase of crimes and conflict that 
this would bring with it. This is because there are two great motives in man, 
which are property and affection. Plato’s utopian project identifies polis and 
oikos, what is only viable by destroying the family: ‘Is it not obvious that a State 
may at length attain such a degree of unity as to be no longer a State? Since the 
nature of a State is to be a plurality and in tending to greater unity, from being 
a State, it becomes a family, and from being a family, an individual; for the 
family may be said to be more than the State, and the individual than the 
family. So that we ought not to attain this greatest unity even if we could, for it 
would be the destruction of the State’ (Pol. II, 2, 1261a 1-4). Popper (The open 
society and its enemies, 1957) places the Platonic project in a ‘historicist’ stream 
of totalitarian thought that would bring us up to the present. 
 
[23] The terms ‘lawful’ and ‘unlawful’ must be understood as morally approved 
(licit) or morally reprehensible (illicit). 
 
[24] Something similar can be deduced from the following statement of Locke 
(Two Treatises of Government: Essay one, Ch. 4, §42): ‘But we know God hath 
not left one man so to the mercy of another, that he may starve him if he please: 
God, the Lord and Father of all, has given no one of his children such a 
property in his peculiar portion of the things of this world, but that he has given 
his needy brother a right to the surplusage of his goods; so that it cannot justly 
be denied him, when his pressing wants call for it’. 
 
[25] Another important theme is usury, discussed in Summa II-II, q. 78. In St. 
Thomas we find an important analytical advance compared with that of 
Aristotle. Usury infringes commutative justice because for money, unlike what 
happens, for example, with a house, the use cannot be separated from the 
property, hence payment of an interest for the ‘use of money’ is always unlawful. 
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When lending, the property of money is transferred and the borrowed money 
disappears with its use. Usury is therefore condemnable: the borrower is paying 
interest for nothing. Another different issue is the so-called ‘extrinsic titles’. 
They are lawful since they are not derived from the lending of money, but they 
are a compensation for damages (dammun emergens), or, actually, the yield of 
some kind of commercial enterprise. In this last case, the property of money is 
not transferred and the lender assumes a risk. A general analysis of usury in 
scholastic thought is Noonan (1957). 
 
[26] According to Schumpeter (1954, p. 93, endnote 15), the fact that question 77 
is about fraud, reveals that St. Thomas understands as fair price that of an 
ordinary competitive market, even if it does not explicitly clarify this (this was 
taken for granted among jurists): if the market is competitive, sellers cannot 
impose a price above the current price. What they can do then is to deceive with 
the quantity or the quality, which is what this question deals with. See also 
Hollander (1965). 
 
[27] It would not be lawful to appropriate the consumer surplus, the practice 
that economic theory calls price discrimination and which is only possible when 
there is market power. There is no progress here in the relationship between the 
degree of competition in the market and the formation of the price. 
 
[28] Smith considers the ‘individual’ moral character of trading irrelevant 
because, at any case, ‘by pursuing his own interest he [every individual] 
frequently promotes that of the society more effectually than when he really 
intends to promote it. I have never known much good by those who affected to 
trade for the public good’ (The Wealth of Nations, Ch. 2). Invisible hand 
‘transforms’ self-interest into public good as an unintended consequence. Given 
its consequences on public good, trading would be lawful regardless of 
individual intentions. This is the core assumption causing the divorce between 
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